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OREGON'S WASTED EFFORT: THE SUPREME CouRT's
INABILITY To ADAPT ITS COMPENSATORY TAX DOCTRINE
TO SOLID WASTE REGULATIONS
JEFFREY J. LAMONTAGNE*
The myriad environmental and economic complexities associated with the
regular disposal of our everyday garbage have led some commentators to call the
complex solid waste disposal situation a modem-day "crisis."' Recent
government reports estimate that a staggering 206.9 million tons of municipal
solid waste ("MSW") were generated and disposed of in the United States in
1993.2 Efforts to regulate and safely dispose of MSW are, of course, nothing
new; however, as with other burgeoning environmental challenges, the onset of
the twentieth century population explosions and increasing consumerism has
presented health, environmental and fiscal difficulties of unexpected magnitude.
MSW landfills escaping the comprehensive solid waste regulatory
authority of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") s have been
the source of all manner of pollution, ranging from "disease vectors, vermin,
gaseous emissions, and liquid run-off'4 to the most serious and common threat of
unregulated MSW landfills, that of leachate percolation and subsequent
contamination of otherwise potable groundwater sources.' The aggregate threat
* Mr. Lamontagne received his B.S. in natural resources from Cornell University in 1991 and
expects to receive his J.D. from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary
in May of 1996.
1. JUDD H. ALEXANDER, IN DEFENSE OF GARBAGE 7 (1993).
2. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, U.S. EPA CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES:
1994 UPDATE 5 (1994). The current MSW disposal total breaks down to an average of 1,650
pounds of MSW" per person per year, or approximately 4.5 pounds per person per day. While the
volume of MSW disposed annually is alone impressive, still more alarming is the fact that the 1993
total represents an increase of 32% over the 156.5 million tons disposed in the U.S. in 1988. See
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 9 (citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID
WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 UPDATE 79 (1991)).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988).
4. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 157.
5. See JACQUELINE V. SwnrrzER, ENvIRONMENTAL POLITICS 105 (1994). Groundwater underneath
MSW landfills often becomes contaminated by relatively small quantities of commonly disposed
hazardous waste (e.g., nail polish, paint thinners, batteries) not screened prior to disposal. Id.
Leachate is the fluid formed when water percolates through a landfill. Id.
In addition, MSW landfills become oxygen starved when they are compacted to reduce
the overall volume. Reduced oxygen levels hamper the oxygen-driven biodegradation process,
thereby retarding the already slow natural degradation of many modem wastes. See ALEXANDER,
supra note 1, at 136-37. Slow degradation of MSW may not by itself present any immediate
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of increasing MSW disposal rates and the attendant social fears, environmental
degradations, and health hazards provided the impetus to enact expensive
regulatory schemes like RCRA.
Although only a minuscule portion of land in the United States is covered
by MSW landfills, several regions and states have been experiencing difficulties
in siting MSW landfills.6 Landfills must meet topographical, geographical and
climatic criteria established by RCRA7 and the more daunting regulations
environmental concerns or health hazards. However, the unsavory thought of garbage as a perpetual
(compared to the human life span) neighbor does nothing to decrease the substantial political
consequences of the "Not in My Backyard" ("NIMBY") factor. The NIMBY factor is generated
when citizens react against the potentially adverse impacts of an environmental nuisance to be
located near their neighborhood. Some argue that the NIMBY factor is the single highest hurdle to
clear in finding an acceptable MSW landfill site. See id. at 22.
6. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 8.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 6942(c) (listing the general guidelines for regulations that guide states in creating
and updating solid waste plans). The provisions of§ 6942(c) have made MSW landfill siting a more
expensive proposition by requiring as part of the siting process the consideration of:
(1) the varying regional, geologic, hydrogeologic, climatic, and other
circumstances under which different solid waste practices are required in order
to insure the reasonable protection of the quality of the ground and surface
waters from leachate contamination, the reasonable protection of the quality of
the surface waters from surface runoff contamination, and the reasonable
protection of ambient air quality;
(2) characteristics and conditions of collection, storage, processing, and disposal
operating methods, techniques, and practices, and location of facilities where
such operating methods, techniques, and practices are conducted, taking into
account the nature of the material to be disposed;
(3) methods for closing or upgrading open dumps for purposes of eliminating
potential health hazards;
(4) population density, distribution, and projected growth;
(5) geographic, geologic, climatic, and hydrologic characteristics;
(6) the type and location of transportation;
(7) the profile of industries;
(8) the constituents and generation rates of waste;
(9) the political, economic, organizational, financial, and management problems
affecting comprehensive solid waste management;
(10) types of resource recovery facilities and resource conservation systems
which are appropriate; and
(11) available new and additional markets for recovered material and energy and
energy resources recovered from solid waste as well as methods for conserving
such materials and energy.
Id. The siting requirements are only a taste of RCRA's expensive comprehensive scheme which
also requires careful management, cleanup and closure practices. RCRA mandates that states
develop methods for achieving, among other objectives, a "reduc[tion in] the volume or quantity
of material that ultimately becomes waste," see id. §§ 6941(a), 6942(b), consequently prompting
states to enact significant disincentives to all generators of MSW, discussed infra text accompanying
notes 9-10.
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promulgated by EPA.' As a result, fewer sites can now be
considered acceptable. Moreover, the task of actually siting a MSW landfill has
consequently become far more expensive, with more research, tests and reports
required to determine a site's acceptability. Added expense also results from
stringent operation, maintenance, cleanup, and closure requirements imposed by
RCRA. 9
States and localities have employed a creative variety of revenue-
generating means"0 to meet expensive regulatory requirements, environmentalist
demands and the increasingly acute "Not in My Backyard" ("NIMBY")
sentiments associated with landfill siting." As part of an attempt to control MSW
generation and to raise revenue, some states have imposed economic burdens on
out-of-state MSW disposers." Such burdens placed by states on interstate
commerce are subject to the strictures of the "dormant," or "negative," Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 3 Although the Commerce Clause is on its face
an affirmative grant of power to Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States,"' 4 the Supreme Court has traditionally
construed the clause as limiting states' ability to regulate interstate commerce
when those regulations amount to economic protectionism and put interstate
commerce at a competitive disadvantage. 5
The Court treats MSW as an article of commerce clearly falling within
the ambit of the "dormant" Commerce Clause. 6 In its seminal case on the
8. 40 C.F.R. §§ 256.01-.65 (1994) (setting guidelines for state plans regarding siting, management,
cleanup, and closure practices).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949(a).
10. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 181-88 (discussing mandatory deposits and other
packaging taxes); J.A. Buflin, The Contribution of Economic Instruments to Solid Waste
Management, in THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY 144-51
(John A. Butlin ed., 1981) [hereinafter EcONOMICS] (discussing broad categories of economic
instruments that serve to deter solid waste generation as well as raise money for funding solid waste
programs); R. KERRY TURNER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICs 252-66 (1993).
11. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 8, 21-22.
12. Information based upon author's experiences in the environmental consulting industry.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
6-2 (2d ed. 1988).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 3.
15. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
309 (1851); TRIBE, supra note 13, § 6-3; Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation ofInterstate Business:
Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 41-42 (1987);
Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax
Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 910 (1986).
16. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 (1978). Part of the importance of this
decision's consideration of MSW as an article of commerce lies in the creation of an "open class"
for other non-traditional entities-including natural resources-that could potentially be considered
articles of commerce. See Chemical Waste Mgmt, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2013 n.3 (1992)
(finding that hazardous waste falls within the ambit of the Commerce Clause); Sporhase v.
1995]
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
burdens on interstate commerce of MSW, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,7
the Court considered a New Jersey statute barring importation of all out-of-state
MSW that did not meet the criteria of the Commissioner of the New Jersey
Department-of Environmental Protection." The Court easily found the statute
unconstitutional on its face because it imposed the entire burden of conserving in-
state MSW landfill space on out-of-state MSW generators, thereby discriminating
against interstate commerce." Subsequent MSW interstate commerce restriction
cases have, not surprisingly, turned on disincentives or regulations restricting
interstate commerce more subtle than the statute struck in City of Philadelphia.20
Nonetheless, the Court's decision in City of Philadelphia represents a crucial
starting point from which to embark on an analysis of later Commerce Clause
MSW cases, not only because the decision was the Court's first foray into modem
interstate MSW disputes, but because the Court's treatment of the statute is
largely representative of its later hostile review of impositions by states upon the
interstate MSW flow.
This Note will focus on Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it relates to
the imposition of a per-ton surcharge on imported MSW. Prior to the Court's
decision in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality,"
holding that such surcharges violate the Commerce Clause,22 surcharges on out-of
state MSW were becoming commonly used tools to generate revenue and restrict
imported MSW.
Specifically, this Note will analyze the merits and repercussions of an
argument by the State of Oregon in Oregon Waste Systems that such surcharges,
despite their facially discriminatory impact, should have been held constitutional
because they functioned as "compensatory taxes,"'23 designed to force out-of-state
Nebraska, 485 U.S. 941, 954-55 (1982) (finding that groundwater falls within the ambit of the
Commerce Clause).
17. 437 U.S. 617.
18. Id at 618.
19. Id. at 617.
20. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1348
(1994) (surcharge on out-of-state MSW); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2021 (1992) (ban on out-of-county MSW); Hunt, 112 S. Ct.
at 2012 (surcharge on out-of-state MSW).
21. 114 S. Ct. 1345.
22. Id. at 1350.
23. Although the compensatory tax is only explicitly suggested in connection with a peripheral
argument made by the state regarding the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the notion that the
surcharge constitutes a compensatory tax pervades the state's entire Commerce Clause argument.
See Respondents' Brief at 31, Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (No. 93-70) (No. 93-108).
More importantly, for purposes of this analysis, the Court posits that "[r]espondents' principal
defense of the higher surcharge on out-of-state MSW is that it is a 'compensatory tax' necessary
to make shippers of such MSW pay their 'fair share' of the costs imposed on Oregon by the
disposal of their MSW in the State." 114 S. Ct. at 1351.
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MSW disposers to pay for their use of Oregon's MSW landfills.24 Although the
Court did not invalidate per se all possible formulations of MSW surcharges on
out-of-state MSW, the uncompromising language of the Court's decision seems
to translate into a grim future for those states wishing to implement and justify
any such surcharges on out-of-state MSW.'
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court should modify its
compensatory tax test, particularly in the case of MSW regulation. The
modification should enable states to account for the costs of environmental
protection, MSW management, and health and safety risks posed by imported
MSW by taxing out-of-state users of MSW landfills at a rate proportional to the
costs imposed on the importing state. Otherwise, states will be severely
hamstrung not only in their ability to force their neighbors who dump in their
state to internalize the real costs of MSW disposal, but also in their ability to
preserve environmental quality and recover both the economic and environmental
costs of allowing out-of-state MSW disposers to dispose at artificially low prices.
First, this Note will chronicle the history of the compensatory tax doctrine
and examine several cases that perhaps could have been decided under, or have
influenced, that doctrine. The origin, purpose, evolution and current contours of
the doctrine will be explored. This Note will then discuss several recent progeny
of City of Philadelphia: Supreme Court decisions striking restrictions on
interstate disposal of MSW and its problematic cousin, hazardous waste. Then,
this Note will detail the confluence of the Court's prior compensatory tax doctrine
with its modem MSW philosophies in Oregon Waste Systems and discuss why the
Court rejected the compensatory tax defense in that case. Next, this Note will
analyze and critique the application of the compensatory tax doctrine in Oregon
Waste Systems in light of recent MSW cases and the purpose of the doctrine.
Finally, this Note will offer suggestions for reformulating the compensatory tax
doctrine, with an eye specifically toward its application to regulations of interstate
commerce in MSW.
I. ORIGIN, EVOLUTON, AND CURRENT CONTOURS OF THE
COMPENSATORY TAX DOCTRINE
A. Origin and Evolution
The idea of a compensatory tax rescuing a facially discriminatory statute
from constitutional infirmity seems to have its origin in the mid-nineteenth
24. 114 S. Ct. at 1351.
25. See infra notes 168-96 and accompanying text. While this Note focuses on the compensatory
tax doctrine as applied to MSW surcharges, the Court's cramped and inconsistent compensatory tax
jurisprudence could also affect interstate regulation of other nontraditional articles of commerce such
as groundwater or hazardous waste. See supra note 16.
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century Supreme Court case Hinson v. Lott.26 In Hinson, Alabama had imposed
a fifty-cents per gallon tax on sellers of "spirituous liquors" who brought their
products into the state for sale.27 However, Alabama also imposed a fifty-cent per
gallon tax on "all whiskey and all brandy from fruits manufactured in
[Alabama]. 28
The Court opined that the tax on out-of-state sellers, if standing alone,
would have violated the Commerce Clause because the distinction about who was
subject to the tax was drawn along state lines, thus impeding interstate commerce
through impermissible discriminatory means.29 However, the Court decided that
because the state imposed an equivalent tax on in-state manufacturers of similar
products, the tax on out-of-state sellers was "only the complementary provision
necessary to make the tax equal on all liquors sold in the State."'3 Thus, the tax
on out-of-state sellers "institute[d] no legislation which discriminate[d] against the
products of sister States, but merely subject[ed] them to the same rate of taxation
which similar articles pa[id] that are manufactured within the State ....,,
While the Court validated the facially discriminatory tax as "complementary, 32
the Court did so without analyzing how the doctrine might apply to other cases,
and without regard to the fact that the two taxes fell on actors engaged in
different commercial activities-selling versus manufacturing. Moreover, the
Court in Hinson did not explain explicitly whether this new doctrine's purpose
was strictly to compensate Alabama, by making out-of-state commercial activity
pay its fair share of taxes, or also to level competition.33
Some sixty years later, the Court began articulating its standards for
determining which taxes are "complementary" in General American Tank Car
Corp. v. Day.34 In Day, Louisiana had imposed on nonresident corporations a tax
of 2.5% of the assessed value of railroad rolling stock. The tax was facially
discriminatory because it applied only to nonresident corporations. However, the
tax's effect was "complementary" because the Louisiana Constitution provided
26. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1868).
27. Id. at 148.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 150.
30. Id. at 153. Earlier cases such as Hinson referred to what is now thought of as a "compensatory
tax" as a "complementary tax." Such taxes have also been reviewed at times as "compensating
taxes."
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The purpose of the tax could have been to level the playing field among commercial
participants in similar industries, so that Alabama liquor manufacturers would not be put at a
competitive disadvantage against out-of-state competitors. The fact that one tax was on sellers while
the other was on manufacturers weakens, perhaps not substantially, the argument that the out-of-
state tax's purpose was to even competition.
34. 270 U.S. 367 (1926).
35. Id. at 370.
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that those subject to the tax were exempt from general local taxes,36 and the 2.5%
tax on railroad rolling stock was nearly identical (allegedly, a 0.04% difference)
to the average rate of Louisiana local taxes."
In upholding the Louisiana tax, the Court announced several aspects that
should be reviewed in determining whether a taxation scheme is a
"complementary tax." First, the Court suggested that imposing a tax on
nonresidents is not obnoxious to the Constitution if the tax, because of a similar
local tax on residents only, is nondiscriminatory in both purpose and effect.3"
Second, "minute differences" between the potentially complementary taxes in
question should not work to destroy the entire scheme, but a "fairness and
reasonableness" standard should be used for comparing the tax's practical
effects.39 The Court upheld the tax on nonresidents after finding that the practical
differences between the two taxes, although one was local and general and the
other specific to nonresidents, were so small as to be "fair and reasonable.
4
Only a few years after Day, the Court reviewed what has come to be
known as the prototype41 for compensatory taxes in Henneford v. Silas Mason.42
At issue in Silas Mason was a Washington two percent use tax on articles of trade
purchased out-of-state but used in-state, thus rendering the tax facially
discriminatory. 4' However, Washington's tax scheme also contained a two
percent tax on almost every retail sale within the state. 4
Again, the Court found the facially discriminatory tax constitutional under
the Commerce Clause not only because the taxes were identical in rate, but also
because they burdened identical transactions: purchases. 45 The burden borne by
out-of-state residents using their out-of-state purchases in Washington was
balanced by an identical in-state burden: "retail sellers in Washington will be
helped to compete upon terms of equality with retail sellers in other states who
are exempt from a sales tax or any corresponding burden." 6 The Court thus
evinced a competition-leveling purpose behind the doctrine to supplement the
purpose of ensuring that revenue-generating burdens on interstate commerce
remain fair relative to burdens imposed on intrastate commerce.47
While the sales tax/use tax dichotomy in Silas Mason offers a prototype
for what the Court now considers "substantially equivalent" events and
36. Id. (citing LA. CoNsT. of 1921, art. X, § 16).
37. Id. at 373.
38. Id at 373-74.
39. Id. at 373.
40. See id. at 373-74.
41. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1353.
42. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
43. Id. at 579.
44. Id. at 579-80.
45. Id at 581.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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compensatory taxes,4 8 the Court has been ready and willing to depart from this
prototype in cases both prior to and following Silas Mason.49 Ironically, an oft-
quoted portion of Silas Mason also left what would seem like substantial
maneuvering room for subsequent flexibility-minded courts: "[t]here is no demand
in . . . [the] Constitution that the state shall put its requirements in any one
statute. It may distribute [taxes] as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its totality,
is within the State's constitutional power."50
B. Contours of Today's Compensatory Tax Test5'
Alaska v. Arctic Maid2 was one of the few cases since Silas Mason in
which the compensatory tax doctrine saved a facially discriminatory tax on'
interstate commerce. In Arctic Maid, the Court considered a 4% tax imposed by
Alaska on the value of fish taken onto "freezer ships"--ships taking frozen
Alaskan fish out-of-state. 3 Freezer ship operators complained that the tax
discriminated against their interstate commercial interests because Alaskan
canneries were not subject to the tax." However, Alaska subjected local
canneries to a six percent tax on the value of fish obtained for canning.5 Alaskan
fish processors paid an additional one percent tax over and above the six percent
tax already paid by Alaskan canneries on the same fish.56
In finding that the freezer ship tax was constitutionally fit, the Court
deemed crucial the fact that "[t]he freezer ships do not compete with those who
freeze fish for the retail market. The freezer ships take their catches south for
canning. Their competitors are the Alaskan canners ... ."" Thus, the Court in
Arctic Maid, as in Silas Mason, considered it paramount that those engaged in
interstate commerce not be put at a competitive disadvantage against those
engaged solely in intrastate commerce. Notably, the Court in Arctic Maid
bypassed scrutiny of any "substantial equivalence" between the fish tax events
48. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text; infra notes 52-61, 80-98, 109-17.
50. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 584 (quoting Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 480 (1932)).
51. To facilitate later analysis, "today's" compensatory tax test is that posited in Oregon Waste
Systems, 114 S. Ct at 1352. The prongs of the compensatory tax test are still evolving, yet the test
in Oregon Waste Systems relies on authority and tests similar to other recent formulations of the
doctrine.
52. 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
53. Id. at 200.
54. Id. at 204.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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when such an analysis would have been far from sure of producing a finding of
"substantial equivalence." '58
Aside from its holding that entirely different commercial activities may
be the subjects of compensatory taxes, the Court appeared to give some flexibility
to the comparison of tax burdens. "If there is a difference between the taxes
imposed... they are not so 'palpably disproportionate' as to run afoul of the
Commerce Clause," the Court declared. 9 "No 'iron rule of equality' between
taxes laid by a State on different types of business is necessary."6 In current
parlance, Arctic Maid requires that a tax on interstate commerce be shown
roughly to approximate-but not exceed-the amount of the similar tax on
intrastate commerce.6'
Two relatively recent cases offer specific formulations for the second and
third prongs currently needed to uphold a compensatory tax defense to a
"dormant" Commerce Clause facial violation. First, according to Oregon Waste
Systems, "the events on which the interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed must
be 'substantially equivalent;' that is, they must be similar in substance to serve
as mutually exclusive 'prox[ies]' for each other."'62 In the case espousing the
necessity of meeting this prong, Armco v. Hardesty,63 West Virginia had imposed
a gross receipts tax on out-of-state manufacturers engaged in wholesaling within
the state.64 Simultaneously, local manufacturers were subject to a significantly
higher manufacturing tax rate than their out-of-state counterparts.6" West Virginia
argued that the purpose of the wholesaling tax was to compensate for the
relatively higher manufacturing tax burden suffered by local manufacturers.66 The
Court, in rejecting West Virginia's argument, announced that:
58. This is another prong of today's compensatory tax test. See infra note 200 and accompanying
text
59. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. at 205 (quoting International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422
(1951)).
60. Id. (quoting Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117, 121 (1948)).
61. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct at 1352. The Arctic Maid rule requiring only rough
approximation was enunciated in a case in which the Court found the interstate commerce tax
burden to be lessthan the burden on the complainants' intrastate competitors. See Arctic Maid, 366
U.S. at 204. However, most Commerce Clause cases are likely to be brought by interstate
commerce participants suffering a higher tax burden than their intrastate competitors. Certainly, the
Court needed less courage to make this proclamation and thus may have "meant" it less in this case
than in the more common situation. Ironically, Arctic Maid was not nominally analyzed pursuant
to the compensatory tax doctrine even though it is cited within Oregon Waste Systems'
pronouncement of the elements of the compensatory tax test Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct
at 1352.
62. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct at 1352 (quoting Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 643
(1984)).
63. 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
64. Id. at 639.
65. Id. at 641.
66. Id. at 642.
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[M]anufacturing and wholesaling are not 'substantially equivalent
event[s]' such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers can be
said to compensate for the admittedly lighter burden placed on
wholesalers from out of state. Manufacturing frequently entails
selling in the State, but we cannot say which portion of the
manufacturing tax is attributable to manufacturing, and which
portion to sales. The fact that the manufacturing tax is not
reduced when a West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out
of state, and that it is reduced when part of the manufacturing
takes place out of state, makes clear that the manufacturing tax
is just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts tax. 7
The Court thus signified its reluctance to compare different tax burdens imposed
on different commercial activities, even if the taxes resulted in the same economic
impact on both parties, as West Virginia claimed. 8 Since Armco, the "substantial
equivalence" requirement has been a fixture in Commerce Clause compensatory
tax analyses.
According to Oregon Waste Systems, to satisfy a compensatory tax
defense, a state must also "[i]dentify ... the [intrastate tax] burden for which the
State is attempting to compensate." 9 In Maryland v. Louisiana," the Court
considered a Louisiana "first use tax" on outer continental shelf ("OCS") gas
brought into Louisiana.7" In trying to justify the tax as compensatory for similar
in-state tax burdens, Louisiana pointed to an identical tax imposed upon in-state
producers of natural gas.72
According to Louisiana, the OCS use tax was "designed to equalize
competition between gas produced in Louisiana and subject to the state severance
tax.., and gas produced elsewhere not subject to the severance tax such as OCS
gas.," The Court struck the tax despite the compensatory tax argument because
Louisiana had no sovereign interest in compensation for resources extracted from
the federally-owned OCS.74 The Court implied that a state trying to justify a
67. Id. at 643 (citation omitted).
68. See id. at 643-44. However, even sales taxes and use taxes do not burden exactly the same
commercial activity: "The sales tax is imposed on the retail transaction, whereas the use tax is
imposed on the use of property." Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 15, at 904. However,
if the results of two different taxes are similar and more easily compared than the Armco taxes (i.e.,
a use tax and a sales tax, or a per pound of tax on fish freezer ships and a per pound tax on local
fish canneries), the Court has been willing to compare taxes that are imposed on different
commercial activities that it nevertheless views as substantially equivalent events.
69. 114 S. Ct. at 1352 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758 (1981)).
70. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
71. Id at 728.
72. See id. at 731.
73. Id. at 732.
74. Id at 759.
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discriminatory burden on interstate commerce must "identif[y] the burden for
which the State is trying to compensate."'75 Although cited as an element separate
from the substantially equivalent events requirement, analysis of the identification
prong in fact returns the Court to the substantially equivalent events requirement:
The [severance tax on government-owned OCS and the first use
tax] are not comparable in the same fashion as a use tax
complements a sales tax. In that case [(use tax and sales tax)],
a State is attempting to impose a tax on a substantially equivalent
event to assure uniform treatment of goods and materials to be
consumed in the State. No such equality exists in this instance.76
Thus, the identification prong apparently has no discernable independent
value as it is framed in Oregon Waste Systems; the requirement is automatically
met as soon as a state convinces a court that the two taxes are substantially
equivalent. Swallowing of the third prong by the second prong makes intuitive
sense. A party able to show that the taxes target substantially equivalent events
must have already successfully identified the events, as well as the parties and the
burdens, being considered for substantial equivalence.77
After the above analysis, the only two requirements left to uphold a
compensatory tax are that the taxes imposed substantially equivalent events7 and
that the taxes levy roughly approximate burdens, provided that the interstate tax
burden does not exceed the intrastate tax burden.7 9 This somewhat clean formula
is sullied, however, by several cases that exert influence in defining the contours
of the compensatory tax test, despite the absence of any compensatory tax
arguments made in them.
75. Id at 758.
76. Id. at 759.
77. Admittedly, Oregon Waste Systems suggests that the identification requirement is a "threshold
matter." 114 S. Ct. at 1352. Although the Court acknowledged that it was only a threshold matter,
its inclusion as a seemingly separate requirement only complicates the already blurred contours of
the compensatory tax test Mentioning only that the substantially equivalent events requirement
needs to be satisfied would have been sufficient to cover the substance of the identification
requirement and would have avoided any additional confusion or prong-adding. The remainder of
this Note is clarified insofar as this discussion rejects the identification requirement misleadingly
introduced by the Court in Oregon Waste Systems as an independent prong of the compensatory tax
test.
78. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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II. OTHER CASES INFLUENCING THE CONTOURS OF THE COMPENSATORY TAX
TEST
Several cases in which a compensatory tax argument was not raised
nevertheless remain particularly instructive as to which tax schemes the doctrine
does and does not encompass, and perhaps should or should not encompass. This
section will highlight several cases that present issues similar to those presented
in compensatory tax cases (i.e., interstate commerce is restricted for reasons that
are at least in part compensatory in nature), but for one reason or another did not
consider the defense. Several issues particularly germane to an analysis of
Oregon Waste Systems are explored in this section, and some of the more salient
holdings of the cases will be analyzed for a comparison to the analysis offered in
Oregon Waste Systems.
A. Can a Tax Functionally Equivalent to a Compensatory Tax Compensate for
a State Burden Imposed Through General Taxes?
Three Supreme Court cases lend partial answers to the question posed by
this subsection. In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,8" the Court considered a fifteen
dollar California tax on cars brought into the state to be sold, while no similar
levy was imposed upon cars being transported solely within the state for sale.81
The basis for the tax on out-of-state cars was that the drivers of such cars, often
acting without compensation and only to obtain free transportation, created special
dangers because of their supposed relative lack of concern for California drivers
and roads, compared to California drivers.82 Moreover, the cars driven into the
state were typically coupled, thus tending to skid more easily than "single" cars,
and the coupled cars were driven in caravans which tended to increase traffic
inconveniences and hazards.8" All told, the caravans caused a disproportionate
amount of wear and tear and hazards on California roads and drivers-a wear and
tear that required added policing and state funds to mitigate.84
California imposed the tax to compensate for the added costs of highway
administration and policing the increased dangers posed by the coupled-car
caravans.85 However, California did not formally offer a "compensatory tax"
argument. The Supreme Court found that the tax, though discriminatory against
interstate commerce, had a basis "abundantly supported by the record,"
particularly because the California legislature had offered comprehensive details
80. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
81. Id. at 585-86.
82. Id. at 591-92.
83. Id. at 592.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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of the burdens imposed by such caravans.86 The Court approved of the tax's
avowed purpose of reimbursing California for the costs of added policing and
repairing wear and tear of the roads.8 7 In deciding that the tax reimbursed the
state for those services, the Court deferred to legislative factfinding."
Notably, the caravan fee compensated for costs incurred by state agencies
responsible for ensuring adequate policing and road maintenance. The funds used
directly for operations of agencies were presumably raised largely through a
general taxation scheme (e.g., income taxes). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
was willing to find that the tax was, implicitly at least, compensatory. 9 Thus,
Clark suggests that a tax may be imposed on interstate commerce to compensate
for a burden imposed on a state by that interstate commercial activity if the state's
expended funds came from the state's general tax scheme.
In addition, the caravan fees obviously put the out-of-state haulers at a
competitive disadvantage. The Court approved the tax without going through a
formal compensatory tax analysis: the substantially equivalent events test was not
addressed, perhaps simply because a compensatory tax argument was not
nominally presented. Presumably, such an argument could have been presented
to accompany the evidence about the police and maintenance costs associated
with the caravans. Did this tax burdening interstate commerce survive because
"compensatory tax" was not argued?
The car sellers also contested the reasonableness of the fee amount.9"
Both parties offered evidence that the tax compensated too little or too much for
the costs incurred by the state,91 but the Court, in finding no egregious deviation
from the true costs incurred, declared that:
The state is not required to compute with mathematical precision
the cost to it of the services necessitated by the caravan traffic.
If the fees charged do not appear to be manifestly
disproportionate to the services rendered, we cannot say from our
own knowledge or experience that they are excessive.92
A somewhat similar taxation comparison arose in Capitol Greyhound
Lines v. Brice.93 In Brice, Maryland had imposed an excise tax on all common
86. Id.
87. See id. at 598-600.
88. See id. at 592, 594.
89. See id. at 599.
90. See id at 598-99. The "reasonableness of the fee amount" is an issue in Clark corresponding,
perhaps, to the rough approximation prong of the compensatory tax test in other cases.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 599 (citation omitted).
93. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
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carriers, both intrastate and interstate, traveling through Maryland.9 Two bus
lines challenged the tax as discriminatory against interstate commerce because it
had no relation to quantity of road use and thus generally taxed interstate carriers
more per mile of travel on Maryland roads than it did intrastate carriers. 95
Maryland did not attempt to identify a specific burden for which it was
attempting to compensate, aside from farming out the privilege of using its roads.
The Supreme Court agreed with Maryland that taxes that impose a burden
on both intrastate and interstate users of roads "are valid unless the amount is
shown to be in excess of fair compensation for the privilege of using [Maryland]
roads."96 The Court chided the bus lines' failure to prove that the taxes were
excessive in comparison to "fair compensation," 97 even though neither party nor
the Court explicitly attempted to approximate reasonably the actual cost of the
privilege. The Court thus seemed to place the burden of proof for comparing the
tax burdens on the out-of-state taxpayer.
Although the tax in Brice was not placed on articles of commerce and had
no discernible impact on interstate competition, the Court repeatedly referred to
the fact that the tax was a form of "compensation," without identifying the
intrastate tax for which the tax on interstate commerce was being imposed.98 If
the compensation was for using the state's roads, then the Court must have been
implying that the state was expending some resource on its roads for which it
deserved compensation. Those resources must have been maintenance and
policing costs, performed through the expenditure of general tax funds. The
Court again implicitly accepted the idea that a specific tax on out-of-state
participants in interstate commerce may compensate a state for expended
resources originally generated through its general tax scheme. Again, the Court
ignored the substantially equivalent events requirement, probably because the state
did not make a compensatory tax argument and did not identify the intrastate tax
for which the state sought compensation.
The Court reached a different conclusion in the more recent American
Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner.99 In Scheiner, the Court refused to
compare the relative burden imposed by a Pennsylvania axle tax on all trucks to
the general tax funds applied to state road maintenance.' The challenge to the
tax was similar to that posed in Brice: the tax in question was discriminatory
against interstate commerce because it had no relation to quantity of road use and
thus generally taxed interstate carriers more per mile on Pennsylvania roads than
94. Id. at 543-44.
95. See id. at 545.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 544-47.
99. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
100. Id. at 288-89.
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it did intrastate carriers."°' Pennsylvania conceded that there were no specific
taxes for which the axle tax was attempting to compensate.'0 2 However, if the
language about "compensation" in Brice meant anything,'0 3 the tax sought only
to compensate for expenses due to the added policing and other administrative
costs associated with out-of-staters using Pennsylvania's roads.
Despite the fact that the tax at issue in Scheiner was a flat tax and, like
that in Brice, not facially discriminatory against interstate commerce, the Court
confessed its reluctance to "plunge... into the morass of weighing comparative
tax burdens" by comparing taxes on dissimilar events. 04 The Court also struck
the tax because the "tax discriminate[d] against out-of-state vehicles by subjecting
them to a much higher charge per mile travelled in the state [and because the tax]
d[id] not.., approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania's
roads." 05
The Court's reluctance to compare different taxes, however, must have
been a thinly veiled excuse for avoiding its real rationale.'0 6 Just how the Court
concluded that the burden on out-of-state vehicles was much higher and that the
tax "d[id] not . . . approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of
Pennsylvania's roads" without first taking the "plunge" and "weighing
comparative tax burdens" remains a mystery. 7 Obviously, the Court did
compare and weigh the relative burdens imposed by the taxes; the Court was
apparently grasping for other grounds on which to reject the tax. Still, the
decision's recency compared to Clark and Brice adds some weight to the Court's
reluctance.108
101. See id. 483 U.S. at 275-76.
102. Id. at 287.
103. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 289-90 (quoting J. HELLERSTEIN, I STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME AND
FRANCHISE TAxEs 4.1215] (1983)).
105. Id. at 290.
106. The Court's real rationale for its decision is subject to a debate largely beyond the scope of
this Note. Perhaps the Court was reluctant to "plunge into the morass" but did anyway in its frenzy
to find problems with the statute, or perhaps the Court wanted to leave itself an escape hatch for
a time when balancing burdens became more complicated.
107. Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 289-90.
108. Although Scheiner must be taken seriously as a limitation upon the substantially equivalent
events test in which the Court will hesitate to compare a general tax scheme to a specific tax, there
is no inherent reason why the Court cannot do so, as it did in Clark and Brice. The Court may have
learned that actually performing such comparisons is more complicated than its rather superficial
comparisons in Clark and Brice. Surely honest and comprehensive attempts at such comparisons
could become complex. However, courts manage to handle all manner of complex matters
accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty with the help of expert witnesses. In Scheiner, the
Court's reluctance may have stemmed in part from the fact that Pennsylvania did not try to break
down how the funds from the general tax scheme were used for the services, if any, for which the
axle tax revenues were to compensate. For example, Pennsylvania did not show how the tax was
just making interstate commerce pay its fair share of its burden on Pennsylvania roads. See id. 483
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B. Is Resource Protection an Adequate Justification for Imposing Reasonable
Restrictions on Interstate Commerce?
Finally, still two other Supreme Court cases are relevant to the Court's
eventual decision in Oregon Waste Systems because they appear to create
"dormant" Commerce Clause exceptions for reasonable protection of natural
resources. The structure of a Montana elk hunting license fee was the source of
dispute before the Court in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission.'0 9 Montana
had recently enacted legislation imposing higher elk hunting license fees on
nonresidents than on its own residents."0 One major purpose of the fee structure
was to compensate Montana for conservation expenditures charged only to
Montana residents through general taxes."' The Court upheld the fee schedule
even though the purpose of the higher fee was to compensate Montana for funds
raised through the general tax scheme." 2
Unique to the analysis in Baldwin, however, was the Court's delineation
of the contours of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: "[i]t has not been
suggested... that state citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to
distinguish among persons." ' Furthermore, the Court added that "'[it is]
importan[t] ... that a state have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation
of an important resource."' 114
Although the Court wielded this language in analyzing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause,"5 one can easily envision Montana putting forth a
compensatory tax defense instead and the Court striking the fee schedule because
the taxed events were not substantially equivalent. While differences exist
between the purposes and functions of the two constitutional clauses, they clearly
exert overlapping spheres of influence. To hold the same tax invalid under one
U.S. at 270-75.
109. 436 U.S. 371, 373 (1978).
110. See id. at 389-90. The higher fee on nonresidents also served to restrict the otherwise great
number of would-be hunters, which in turn worked to maintain Montana's elk population at a
sustainable level. See id.
111. The Court listed a litany of programs that the general tax scheme helped to fund that directly
or indirectly benefited nonresident hunters, including: production and maintenance of big game
populations, support for state parks, roads providing access to hunting areas, fire suppression to
protect wildlife habitat habitat benefits effected by Montana's Environmental Quality Council,
enforcement of air and water quality standards, assistance by sheriff s departments to enforce game
laws, state highway patrol officers who assist wildlife officers at game checking stations and forage
support by resident ranchers. Id. at 389.
112. See id. at 389-90. The Court's comparison of Montana's general tax scheme with its license
fee structure appears contradictory with its later holding in Scheiner, further weakening the
precedential integrity of the Court's reluctance in Scheinerto perform the same kind of comparison.
113. Id. at 383.
114. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
115. See id. at 383-86.
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clause because it does not meet the substantially equivalent events requirement
of the compensatory tax test, but valid under the other clause because "'[it is]
importan[t] ... that a state have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation
of an important resource'.. 6 through means of a functionally compensatory tax,
is surely to elevate form over substance.
Perhaps most importantly, the Court realized that the tax's purpose was
not only to compensate but also to regulate indirectly and thus to preserve a
natural resource." 7 In doing so, the Court implicitly validated the tax's objective
as a resource use disincentive to supplement any compensatory purpose or effect
of the tax. The Baldwin decision may not have directly impacted interstate
competition like a manufacturing or use tax would have, but the Court's decision
to allow Montana to protect its resources certainly had some tangential
competitive impact on interstate commerce around Montana. The elk themselves
may not have been bought or sold in interstate commerce, but out-of-state hunting
outfitters and gun vendors probably suffered in comparison to their Montana
counterparts. In addition, the advantage given to Montana residents over their
counterparts in the taking of elk certainly has some of the characteristics of
discrimination in interstate commerce. Yet, the Court did not allow these
considerations to restrain it from validating Montana's resource protectionist fee
schedule.
Sporhase v. Nebraska involved the use of another state's scarce natural
resource-groundwater." 8  The measure at issue in Sporhase was a resource
protectionist regulation that was also intended to be compensatory through
reciprocal agreements for groundwater use, rather than a tax. A Nebraska statute
restricted the withdrawal of groundwater from any Nebraska well if the person
extracting the groundwater intended to use it outside of Nebraska." 9 To
compensate for the extraction of Nebraska groundwater, the statute required the
state of the permittee, as part of the condition for permitting, to grant reciprocal
groundwater rights to Nebraska users. 20 Because the law placed restrictions on
groundwater extractor permits, the case was not argued under the compensatory
tax doctrine. The Court struck the provision primarily because Colorado, where
appellants were planning to use the groundwater, had a statutory provision
predating Nebraska's that forbade the exportation of any of its groundwater.'
116. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 390. The Court took care to draw a distinction between resource and economic
protectionism, suggestingthat resource protectionism is more justifiable under the Commerce Clause
than economic protectionism, which is forbidden. Id.
118. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 944.
121. See id. at 957-58.
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Thus, Nebraska's reciprocity provision "act[ed] as an explicit barrier to the
commerce between the two States. 122
Nevertheless, aside from the reciprocity problems faced when compared
to the Colorado statute, the Court found some reasons to uphold the statute,
perhaps establishing boundaries for subsequent natural resource
protection/compensation cases. For instance, the Court noted that "[o]bviously,
a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is
not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the
uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State. 12'  The Court thus indicated that
even a restriction on interstate commerce to which the imposing state's citizens
are not subject may be upheld if the imposing state's citizens are already similarly
burdened. Applied to compensatory tax doctrine, this language in Sporhase
suggests that a court could uphold a tax burden upon nonresidents if residents of
the imposing state are already burdened with preserving the resource, even if the
incidence of the taxes vary somewhat across state lines. Moreover, the Court in
Sporhase sweepingly proclaimed that:
[A] State's power to regulate the use of water in times and places
of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its
citizens-and not simply the health of its economy is at the
core of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we
have long recognized a difference between economic
protectionism ... and health and safety regulation. 24
Again, the Court suggested a favorable disposition toward an essentially
discriminatory compensatory provision because a primary aim of the provision is
health, safety and resource protection.
The restrictions reviewed in Baldwin and Sporhase contained a heavy
proportion of compensatory intent mixed with resource protectionism. Both
statutes were facially discriminatory and affected interstate commerce. The only
reason that both statutes were not upheld was that one was not tailored narrowly
enough to integrate effectively its neighbor's unreasonable restrictions.'25 Viewed
from another perspective, perhaps the only reason both statutes had an opportunity
to survive was because neither quite met the qualifications to be argued under the
Court's narrow compensatory tax doctrine.
122. One might wonder why Nebraska's statute was struck while Colorado's statute arguably
placed a far greater restriction on interstate commerce. Apparently, the answer is that Nebraska was
the first state taken to task: "[Nebraska's] reciprocity agreement cannot, of course, be justified as
a response to another state's unreasonable burden on commerce." Id. at 958 n.18.
123. Id. at 955-56.
124. Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 958.
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I. OTHER POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON OREGON WASTE SYSTEmS: RECENT
STATUTES RESTRICTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF MSW STRUCK BY THE
COURT
Two recent Supreme Court cases-Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Michigan Department of Natural Resources'26 and Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt 27-- shed light on the Court's hostile approach to Commerce Clause
restrictions in the context of MSW restrictions and thus provide some insight into
the Court's later decision in Oregon Waste Systems. Moreover, these twin
cases 1 offer insight into how the Oregon Waste-Systems case differs from prior
restrictions on interstate MSW commerce that have been struck by the Court-and
what may be done to help states like Oregon justify their carefully planned
reasonable burdens on interstate commerce.
At issue in Fort Gratiot was a Michigan solid waste statute that allowed
counties to place an absolute ban on the importation of out-of-county solid
waste. 29 Relying heavily on City of Philadelphia, the Court struck down the
statute because such a ban by any county would have not only impeded intrastate-
intercounty MSW disposal (which apparently was permissible) but also interstate
commerce. 3 ° The statute was also "protectionist" for health and safety reasons
but could not be rescued from constitutional condemnation.13 The Court easily
found that Michigan's attempt to impose an absolute ban against non-local MSW
violated the Commerce Clause.
3 2
In Hunt, Alabama had imposed a disposal surcharge on all hazardous
waste generated outside the state.'33 The trial court rejected the state's
compensatory tax argument, and that argument was not presented before the
United States Supreme Court.'34 Alabama did not base its defense to the
surcharge 135 on any specific accounting of the relative costs imposed on Alabama
residents but instead couched their argument largely in protectionist terms-to
126. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
127. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
128. The two cases were issued together. Id.; Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. 2019.
129. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct at 2021.
130. Id. at 2025-26.
131. Id at 2027 ("There is... no valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of waste
that a landfill operator may accept from outside the State, but not the amount that the operator may
accept from inside the State.").
132. Id. at 2028.
133. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2011.
134. Id at 2016 n.9.
135. The surcharge at issue in Hunt was $72.00 per ton which, when added to a base fee of $25.60
per ton for all hazardous wastes disposed in Alabama, created the disparity of charging a total of
$97.60 per ton to out-of-state disposers versus the $25.60 base fee to in-state disposers. Id. at 2012.
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protect the health and safety of Alabama citizens.'36 Alabama's argument in the
United States Supreme Court did not differ significantly from the conclusions
reached and given in the Alabama Supreme Court decision:
The Additional Fee serves these legitimate local purposes that
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives: (1) protection of the health and safety of the
citizens of Alabama from toxic substances; (2) conservation of
the environment and the state's natural resources; (3) provision
for compensatory revenue for the costs and burdens that out-of-
state waste generators impose by dumping their hazardous waste
in Alabama; (4) reduction of the overall flow of wastes traveling
on the state's highways, which flow creates a great risk to the
health and safety of the state's citizens. 3 7
The Alabama Supreme Court, while not hearing argument expressly
geared toward the compensatory tax issue, seemed to rule anyway that the fee was
compensatory.'38 However, even if Alabama had expressly argued that the
surcharge was a compensatory tax, the United States Supreme Court would have
had little justification to uphold the surcharge because Alabama apparently did not
present any information as to why the state reached a figure of $72.00 per ton
other than through arbitrary means. Thus, the surcharge doubtfully would have
survived the rough approximation prong of the compensatory tax test. For this
reason and others,'39 a compensatory tax argument certainly would have failed had
Alabama brought it before the Court.
Hunt and Fort Gratiot combined to warn that the Court would not accept
restrictions on interstate MSW commerce solely for health and safety reasons.
The protectionist statutes reviewed in both cases, however, had arbitrary effects:
an arbitrary absolute ban on disposal of interstate MSW in Fort Gratiot40 and an
arbitrarily inflated surcharge in Hunt when a small amount of state costs were at
136. let at 2014-16.
137. Id. at 2014 (quoting Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1389 (Ala.
1991)) (emphasis added).
138. See iat; see also Hunt, 584 So. 2d at 1388 (stating that the legislature in enacting the fee "was
merely asking the states that are using Alabama as a dumping ground for their hazardous wastes to
bear some of the costs for the increased risk they bring to the environment and the health and safety
of the people of Alabama.").
139. Also, the single facility accepting hazardous waste in Alabama was private, and the facility
basically paid for itself through private funds. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2011. While there were some state
costs associated with regulating the facility for which it could be argued that compensation was
appropriate, those costs were relatively small because the cost of operation, liability, etc., remained
with the private disposal facility. Thus, a compensatory tax argument could not have been argued
other than on grounds of compensation for resource depreciation.
140. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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issue.141 The Court had yet to review a case in which a state, in trying to
compensate for costs passed on to its own citizens through taxes, placed a
restriction on interstate MSW movement that was not arbitrary.
IV. OREGON WASTE SYSTEfs AND THE COMPENSATORY TAX
I
In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department ofEnvironmental Quality,"'
the United States Supreme Court finally heard argument that a solid waste
surcharge actually represented a compensatory tax designed to compensate for
both the added tax burden associated with regulating and cleaning up MSW
landfills and the increased health and safety risks of the citizens of the importing
state. 1
43
A. Oregon's Surcharge on Out-of-State Waste
In addition to a base fee of $0.85 per ton imposed on all MSW disposed
in Oregon MSW landfills,' the Oregon Legislature in 1989 imposed a surcharge
on "every person who disposes of solid waste generated out-of-state in a disposal
site or regional disposal site [within Oregon]."' 45 The Legislature did not specify
the amount of the surcharge but instead left that task to the Environmental
Quality Commission ("EQC") with instructions that the surcharge "be based on
the costs to the State of Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid
waste generated out-of-state which are not otherwise paid for under [specific
statutes]."146
The EQC then followed its normal rulemaking procedures to set a fee
consistent with the statutory directive.147 The EQC held hearings on the surcharge
in several cities, "receiv[ing] testimony and written comments from dozens of
interested parties.' 4' After calculating an initial surcharge, the EQC retained an
independent economic consultant and revised their previous methodology as well
141. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
142. 114 S. Ct. 1345.
143. See Respondents' Brief, Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (No. 93-70) (No. 93-108).
144. See OR. REv. STAT. § 459A.110(1) (Supp. 1994) (authorizing fee on in-state waste); id. §
459A.1 10(8) (authorizing equal fee on out-of-state waste). See also Oregon Waste Systems, 114
S. Ct. at 1348 (describing $0.85 base fee).
145. OR REv. STAT. § 459.297(1) (1991).
146. Id. § 459.298. The statute also provided that the "costs may include but need not be limited
to costs incurred for: (1) Solid waste management (2) Issuing new and renewal permits for solid
waste disposal sites; (3) Environmental monitoring; (4) Ground water monitoring; and (5) Site
closure and post-closure activities." Id
147. See Respondents' Brief at 5-6, Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (No. 93-70) (No. 93-
108).
148. Id. at 5.
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as their fee in response to their consultant's comments. 49 Although no formal
parties were identified, no formal record was created, no witnesses were sworn,
and no cross-examination was allowed, the surcharge was created under the
general guideline that the surcharge represent a "reasonable assessment of the cost
to Oregon of accepting out-of-state waste. . . not ... inflated to discourage
importation of waste, nor deflated to encourage importation of waste."'"5 At the
completion of the rulemaking procedures, the EQC finally set the surcharge,
which became effective January 1, 1991, at $2.25 per ton.'
Thus, with the imposition of the surcharge, Oregon subjected out-of-state
MSW to a much higher overall disposal charge ($3.10 per ton) than in-state MSW
(only $0.85 per ton). 52  The EQC divulged many of the specifics of its
calculations, showing how the agency reached the $2.25 figure."' Oregon later
justified the surcharge with what was to be its primary legal argument for
upholding the tax:
The differen[ce] ... does not mean that the overall costs borne
by Oregon citizens and waste generators for in-state waste
disposal are lower than for disposal of out-of-state waste. Under
Oregon's statutory scheme, in-state disposal costs are recovered
partially through the $.85 per ton disposal fee and also through
general fund revenues .... Out-of-state waste producers pay a
higher disposal fee because general revenues and fees generated
from in-state waste would otherwise have to support the
proportionate share of Oregon's program attributable to the costs
of out-of-state waste disposal. 4
B. The Oregon Court of Appeals Decision
Soon after the EQC rulemaking, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., along with
Columbia Resource Company ("CRC") and Gilliam County, Oregon, filed a
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id.
151. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-97-120(7) (1990).
152. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1348.
153. Id. at 1355 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Petition for Certiorari at 4, Oregon Waste
Systems, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (No. 93-70) (No. 93-108)). The identified costs composing the surcharge
included: $0.72 per ton for increased environmental liability, $0.66 per ton for reimbursements to
the state for tax credits and other public subsidies, $0.58 per ton for statewide activities for reducing
environmental risks and improving solid waste management, $0.20 per ton for lost disposal capacity,
$0.05 per ton for solid waste reduction activities related to the review and certification of waste
reduction and recycling plans, $0.03 per ton for supporting the public infrastructure, and $0.01 per
ton for nuisance impacts from transportation. Id.
154. Respondents' Brief at 9, Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (No. 93-70) (No. 93-108)
(citations omitted).
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complaint against the EQC in the Oregon Court of Appeals.155 Notably, the initial
filing in the Court of Appeals meant that, while appellate review would be
expedited, factfinding was bypassed; the methods used by EQC to arrive at the
$2.25 figure could not be evaluated in the court.156 The petitioners challenged
both the surcharge and its enabling statutes under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.
157
The court found that the challenger of a potential Commerce Clause
violation "has the burden to show that the fee is excessive for the purpose for
which it is collected" ' and that petitioners had not met that burden.159 Thus, the
court upheld the surcharge because it "exact[ed] a compensatory fee for the
distinct burden that the state incurs to regulate and facilitate disposal of out-of-
state waste."'60 In fact, the court deferred to the judgment of the legislature,
which in the court's estimation had made "abundantly clear that it intend[ed] only
to make 'out of state generators pay their 'fair share' of the costs' and no
more."
161
C. The Oregon Supreme Court Decision
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Oregon Court of Appeals' ruling
in Gilliam County v. Department of Environmental Quality. 62 Despite noting the
resemblance between the Oregon surcharge and the surcharge at issue in Hunt,
the Oregon Supreme Court found that the surcharge constituted a compensatory
fee. "'63 In upholding the surcharge, the court noted that "[b]ecause of [its] express
nexus to actual costs incurred [by state and local governments] . .. [t]here is a
discernible basis for the surcharge apart from [its out-of-state] origin.""'
155. Gilliam County v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 837 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. Ct. App. 1992),
affd, 849 P.2d 500 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994). Oregon Waste Systems operated a
MSW landfill in Gilliam County that accepted solid waste, from both in-state and out-of-state
sources, for disposal. Id CRC had a twenty year contract with Clark County, Washington, under
which CRC transported MSW via barge to Morrow County, Oregon. Id.
156. Id. at 977.
157. Id. at 968, 974.
158. Id at 975 (citing Clark, 306 U.S. at 599).
159. See id. at 977.
160. Id. at 976. Although on appeal the surcharge was argued under "compensatory tax" doctrine,
the Oregon Court of Appeals thought the surcharge a "compensatory fee." Id. The court suggested
that a compensatory tax "is a general revenue measure that is intended to equalize the tax burden
between substantially similar interstate and intrastate transactions" but ironically did not offer a
definition for a "compensatory fee." Id. at 975 & n.18. As the Oregon and United States Supreme
Courts understood the surcharge to fall within a class of potentially compensatory taxes, the
distinction made by the Oregon Court of Appeals seems to be minimal, and maybe only nominal.
161. Id at 977 (quoting Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2016 n.9).
162. 849 P.2d 500, 508 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
163. Id
164. Id
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Moreover, the surcharge was "'demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated
to economic protectionism."" 65 Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court found that no
parties were put at a competitive disadvantage in contravention of the Commerce
Clause but instead that Oregon's objectives and results were only to recover the
costs imposed by out-of-state MSW and to protect its natural resources. 16
Finally, the court noted generally that "[a] law imposing a compensatory fee for
costs incurred by a state in supervising and regulating the activities of an entity
engaged in interstate commerce is prima facie reasonable."'67 The surcharge,
however, was to receive quite different treatment on review.
D. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
After granting certiorari because of a conflict between the Oregon
Supreme Court decision and a Seventh Circuit decision, 6 ' the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's decision and found that the
surcharge violated the Commerce Clause. 69  Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority, found the surcharge to be discriminatory and invalid under the
Commerce Clause because it divided economic burdens associated with MSW
along state lines without ample justification.' Furthermore, the majority found
the tax could not be saved from constitutional infirmity by the compensatory tax
doctrine for a variety of reasons.'
After restating the Commerce Clause's "negative" aspect prohibiting states
from unjustifiably discriminating against or burdening the interstate flow of
articles of commerce, the majority constructed a framework for its rejection of the
surcharge by alluding to the possibility of the Balkanization of the states if such
surcharges were held to be constitutional and other states were to follow Oregon's
example. The majority easily found that the surcharge was per se invalid
because of its "obvious" discriminatory effect upon interstate commerce. 73 In
structuring its fee system in the way that it did, Oregon "tax[ed] a transaction.
165. Id. (quoting Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2015).
166. Id. Notably, because Oregon laws restrict the scope ofjudicial review of administrative rules
in expedited proceedings, the Oregon Supreme Court did not decide the factual question of whether
the surcharge on out-of-state MSW was disproportionate to the costs incurred by in-state MSW
disposers. Id. at 508-09.
167. Id. at 508.
168. See Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct at 1349 (citing Government Suppliers Consolidating
Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1284 (1992)).
169. Id at 1355.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1351-53.
172. Id. at 1349.
173. Id. at 1350.
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. . more heavily when it crosse[d] state lines than when it occurr[ed] entirely
within the State."'74  The majority asserted that the extent of the difference
between the fees imposed on in-state and out-of-state MSW was irrelevant--any
difference would be considered discriminatory. 75 The majority stated:
We find respondents' narrow focus on Oregon's compensatory
aim to be foreclosed by our precedents. As we reiterated in
Chemical Waste, the purpose of, or justification for, a law has no
bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory. Consequently,
even if the surcharge merely recoups the costs of disposing of
out-of-state waste in Oregon, the fact remains that the differential
charge favors shippers of Oregon waste over their counterparts
handling waste generated in other States. In making that
geographic distinction, the surcharge patently discriminates
against interstate commerce. 76
Thus, the majority implied that compensation for local and state government
expenses cannot be a defense to a finding of a regulation's discriminatory
character; as a threshold matter, a regulation will be facially discriminatory and
thus subject to strict scrutiny despite any underlying compensatory rationale. 77
However, the majority found that the same regulation could be rescued from
constitutional infirmity if its purpose was "compensatory, 17' and it satisfied the
various prongs for a compensatory tax outlined in the Court's previous
compensatory tax cases.
179
The respondents' primary defense was that the surcharge constituted a
'compensatory tax' necessary to make shippers of such waste pay their 'fair
share' of the costs imposed on Oregon by the disposal of their [MSW] in the
State."'80 After noting the door left open in Hunt that could allow a surcharge
like Oregon's to escape constitutional infirmity, the majority found that
"[a]lthough it is often no mean feat to determine whether a challenged tax is a
compensatory tax, we have little difficulty concluding that the Oregon surcharge
is not such a tax....
The majority offered as its initial definition of a compensatory tax the
same definition offered in Maryland v. Louisiana: "a facially discriminatory tax
that imposes on interstate commerce the rough equivalent of an identifiable and
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 1350 & n.4.
176. Id. at 1350 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
177. See id.
178. Id. at 1352.
179. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
180. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1351.
181. Id.
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'substantially similar' tax on intrastate commerce does not offend the negative
Commerce Clause." ' Because the respondents presented to the Court the first
serious compensatory tax defense in some time, the majority elaborated upon its
definition of the compensatory tax doctrine by setting out the specific prongs of
the test. Specifically, the majority, reworking and combining the features of past
compensatory tax cases,1 3 articulated that:
A state must, as a threshold matter, "identifLy] ... the [intrastate
tax] burden for which the state is attempting to compensate."
Maryland.... Once that burden has been identified, the tax on
interstate commerce must be shown roughly to approximate-but
not exceed-the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce. See,
e.g., Alaska v. Arctic Maid... Finally, the events on which the
interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed must be "substantially
equivalent"; that is, they must be sufficiently similar in substance
to serve as mutually exclusive "prox[ies]" for each other.
Armco.1
84
Respondents' compensatory tax argument failed first because the
"[r]espondents' fail[ed] to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce equal
to or exceeding the surcharge.' 8  The majority found unpersuasive respondents'
argument that its general taxation pays as much for costs associated with in-state
MSW landfills as does the out-of-state surcharge. 186 Intimating that funds raised
through general taxation could never have a compensatory tax counterpart, the
majority sweepingly found that "'[general] tax payments are received for the
general purposes of the [government], and are, upon proper receipt, lost in the
general revenues.""
8 7
The majority also found that the surcharge could not withstand scrutiny
under the compensatory tax test because the surcharge was not substantially
equivalent to taxes imposed on Oregonians. 18 As its primary example of taxes
on "substantially equivalent" events, the majority pointed to the "prototypical
example" of taxes on "the sale and use of articles of trade.' 19 Admitting its
"reluctance to recognize new categories of compensatory taxes," the majority
182. Id. at 1352 (quoting Maryland, 451 U.S. at 758-59).
183. Of course, not all of the cases from which the compensatory tax test was derived were initially
argued as "compensatory tax" cases. See, e.g., Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199).
184. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1352 (citations omitted). Note that this is the test
described earlier. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
185. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1352.
186. Id. at 1353.
187. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). -
188. See id
189. Id. (citing Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 579).
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easily found that MSW disposal and income earning were not substantially
equivalent events."'
The majority was reluctant to explain why it would not recognize new
categories of compensatory taxes or why it was appropriate in this case to require
that the taxes be imposed on substantially equivalent events. Instead, the
majority's only rationale for rejecting the respondents' general taxation argument,
beyond citing amalgamated and largely unrelated bits of precedent, was that:
[P]ermitting discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce to
compensate for charges purportedly included in general forms of
intrastate taxation "would allow a state to tax intrastate commerce
more heavily than in-state commerce anytime the entities
involved in interstate commerce happened to use facilities
supported by general state tax funds. '19
Because the majority found the first two prongs not satisfied,'92 it had no
apparent need to address the third prong of its enunciated compensatory tax test:
whether the identifiable tax on interstate commerce was a rough approximation
of the tax on interstate commerce. 3 Instead, the majority moved on to address
and reject both of respondents' two final arguments that did not rely on the
compensatory tax formulation'94 and remanded the case back to the Oregon
Supreme Court. 5
Notably, the respondents did not argue before the Court that out-of-state
MSW presented a unique health or safety concern not found in Oregon or that the
190. Id.
191. Id at n.8 (quoting Bayh, 975 F.2d at 1284).
192. The finding that the respondents could not identify the compensating intrastate tax burden was
unnecessary and logically subsumed by the Court's finding that the taxes at issue in this case did
not tax substantially equivalent events. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
193. See Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1353.
194. lI at 1353-54. The Court rejected an independent assertion that the. surcharge was
constitutionally valid as a cost-spreading measure. Id The Court also disagreed with Oregon's
suggestion that the surcharge's purpose as resource protection instead of economic protectionism
should save it from constitutional infinity. Id at 1354.
While agreeing that the surcharge could possibly be construed as resource protectionism,
the majority recalled City ofPhiladelphia in rejecting the argument: "[A]ssuming that landfill space
is a 'natural resource,' 'a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over
consumers in other States to natural resources located within its own borders."' Id. at 1354 (quoting
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627). Any apparent exception to the City of Philadelphia rule
granted in Sporhase was unique only because the resource at issue in Sporhase was water which,
"'unlike other natural resources, is essential for human survival."' Id. (quoting Sporhase, 458 U.S.
at 952). Implicitly, the majority found that hazards associated with MSW did not pose dangers as
serious as that of a potential water shortage.
195. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1355.
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disposal of out-of-state MSW imposed a higher cost on Oregonians than the
disposal of in-state MSW."9 '
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rebnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed a vigorous
dissent that disagreed with most of the majority's reasoning.'97 Citing the serious
problems generally posed by increasing MSW disposal rates and the cost to state
and local governments to control MSW problems,'98 Rehnquist found Oregon's
surcharge to be a responsible reaction to its specific problems and a permissible
restriction on interstate commerce.' In objecting to what he called "t[ying] the
hands of the States,"2 "0 Rehnquist charged that the majority "stubbornly refuse[d]
to acknowledge that a clean and healthy environment, unthreatened by the
improper disposal of solid waste, is the commodity really at issue in [this]
1)SD, :201
caseo." 0
Rehnquist cited the careful and specific breakdown of costs made by the
EQC to arrive at its total of $2.25202 as justification for its surcharge.203 Rehnquist
also acknowledged the expected added costs to individual out-of-state disposers
calculated by respondents in an attempt to dampen the apparent impact of the
surcharge, repeating the respondents' cost calculation of approximately $0.14 per
month to a hypothetical nonresident who disposes of all of her MSW in
Oregon.
204
196. Id. at 1351. A successful argument premised on the notion that imported MSW presented a
unique health or safety hazard not found in Oregon would have enabled the statute to bypass further
scrutiny pursuant to Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-52 (1986). Of course, the respondents
could not prove anything uniquely hazardous about out-of-state MSW.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, cites Maine not because MSW poses
a unique risk but simply because it poses some risk to Oregonians' health and safety. Oregon Waste
Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Maine, 477 U.S. at 151). Rehnquist
found that the surcharge did "not 'needlessly obstructo] interstate trade or attempt] to place
[Oregon] in a position of economic isolation;' instead, he found the surcharge a useful tool within
its "'broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of
its natural resources."' Id. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Maine, 477 U.S. at 151).
197. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1355-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 1355-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 1358-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1355 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1356 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
202. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
203. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1355 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
204. IaH at n.2 (Reinquist, C.J., dissenting). Given the Court's previous finding of a "residuum
of power" to regulate interstate commerce left to the states in the absence of any contradictory
congressional authority, Rehnquist wondered how an additional $0.14 per week exceeded that
residuum. Id at 1359 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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While Rehnquist found weight in the careful tailoring of the surcharge by
the EQC and the limited burden on out-of-state MSW generators, his legal
analysis centered primarily on what he perceived to be the majority's "nonchalant
conclusion" in finding the surcharge a failure under compensatory tax doctrine. 05
When addressing the respondents' compensatory tax argument, Rehnquist found
that the majority's focus on differential fees was "myopic" because of its refusal
to compare the indirect payment, including the solid waste program's regulatory
fees as well as the general taxation scheme, to the specific surcharge.206
Rehnquist exposed what he viewed as the majority's hypocrisy by comparing its
holding to Baldwin,2" asserting that if Oregon "owned... a park or recreational
facility [instead of landfill space], it would be allowed to charge differential fees
for in-state and out-of-state users of the resource."2 8 Rehnquist found that the
$2.25 per ton fee on nonresidents represented a "fair approximation" of the
privilege to use Oregon's MSW landfills. 209
Rehnquist also attacked the majority's application of the substantially
equivalent events prong of its compensatory tax test.210 Ignoring the "events"
portion of the prong, and arguably twisting the prong's application to a
comparison of the tax burdens instead of the taxed events, Rehnquist found the
$0.14 per week difference small enough to find the two taxes substantially
equivalent.2
In addition, Rehnquist drew a critical analogy between the groundwater
restriction at issue in Sporhase12 and the surcharge at issue in Oregon Waste
Systems. 213 When the health and safety of a citizenry are at issue, Rehnquist
observed that "[t]he Commerce Clause does not require a State to abide this
outcome where the 'natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly
produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of
shortage."'214 According to Rehnquist, the Court has long distinguished betwe6n
resource and economic protectionism and has viewed the "control over the
collection and disposal of solid waste [as] a legitimate, nonarbitrary exercise of
police powers to protect health and safety."2 5
Further dissecting the majority's failure to distinguish between the merits
of economic and resource protectionism, Rehnquist observed that Oregon MSW
205. Id. at 1356 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
207. 436 U.S. 371. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
208. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1358 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting).
209. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
210. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
212. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
213. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1356 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting) (citing Sporhase, 458
U.S. 941).
214. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957).
215. Id. at 1356-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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generators did not compete with out-of-state MSW producers to sell MSW and
that the surcharge thus did not offer in-state MSW generators a competitive
advantage over their out-of-state counterparts by the surchargeZ 6-- the primary
evil prevented by the "negative" Commerce Clause. 17 Instead, Rehnquist found,
the Court's decision would tangibly disadvantage Oregon businesses because they,
in contrast to their out-of-state counterparts, would have to pay the indirect
"nondisposal" costs of operating and maintaining a safe MSW landfill system in
Oregon. 21
8
In an attempt to avoid Balkanization of the states through striking down
discriminatory surcharges, the Supreme Court had instead forced states into a
difficult position, according to Rehnquist. The Chief Justice envisioned two
divergent fates for states after the Court's decision: "become a dumper and ship
as much waste as possible to a less populated State, or become a dumpee, and
stoically accept waste from more densely populated States."2 9  Less-densely
populated states such as Oregon, Rehnquist imagined, would be compelled to
become dumping grounds given the majority's Commerce Clausejurisprudence.220
Ultimately, Rehnquist concluded, the Court's decision hamstrung states in their
attempts to meet "the environmental, health, safety, and political challenges posed
by the problem of solid waste disposal in modem society.' 22'
V. ANALYSIS OF OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS IN LIGHT OF PRIOR
COMPENSATORY TAX AND MSW-COMMERCE CLAUSE PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court in Oregon Waste Systems offered a mechanical, and
at times misleading, application of the compensatory tax test. The test had been
developed in cases in which traditional articles of commerce-manufactured,
bought and sold by competitors on the market-were the subject of restrictions.
Because the doctrine evolved in a different context, the test demanded adaptation
before being applied to restrictions on non-traditional articles of commerce like
216. Id. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
217. See TRIBE, supra note 13, §§ 6-2, 6-3; DuMond, 366 U.S. at 529.
218. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Without the
surcharge, Rehnquist surmises, both Oregonians and non-Oregonians would have to pay MSW
disposal fees, but only Oregonians would have to pay "nondisposal" fees that finance "landfill siting,
landfill clean-up, insurance to cover environmental accidents, and transportation improvement costs
associated with out-of-state waste being shipped into the State." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Rehaquist's list did not even account for environmental problems such as extra air pollution, noise
and nuisances resulting from the significant increase in trucks hauling out-of-state waste. Nor does
Rehnquist's list include difficult-to-calculate externalities, suchasmedical expenses, worktime lost,
aesthetic harm, reduced land area for landfill siting or other use, and reduced property values. For
a discussion of externalities in general, see also TURNER Er AL., supra note 10, at 25-26.
219. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1359 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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MSW that attempted to compensate for depreciated value and loss of resources,
and potentially increased health and safety risks.
As noted earlier, the Court's insistence upon the state's identification of
an intrastate tax burden for which it was attempting to compensate was a hollow
hurdle placed by the Court in the path of the state.222 Even worse than the
redundance of this prong compared to the substantially equivalent events prong
is that its addition needlessly taunts the state for not having a specific tax burden
for which it is trying to compensate, thus making it appear that the state cannot
even meet this "threshold matter."2'
A far more serious and substantive defect in the Court's opinion is the
majority's application of the substantially equivalent events prong, which is
misapplied and unfortunately unaccompanied by any meaningful rationale.224 The
Court undermined the argument that the surcharge compensated for expenditures
derived from Oregon's general tax scheme by opining that whether the tax is
compensatory is too difficult to determine because general taxes are "lost in the
general revenues" prior to their use for specific programs like solid waste
management.2' The Court apparently wanted to see an administrative
nightmare-specific taxes maintained in separate accounts after collection, and
then spent only on the state program for which they were designated-before it
would find that two taxes were identifiable and based upon substantially
equivalent events. This reluctance is subject to the earlier criticism that it
generally flies in the face of the Court's past willingness to engage in
comparisons of specific and general taxes.226
The Court then initiated its substantially equivalent events prong review
in earnest by offering the prototype of sales and use taxes that was the subject of
Silas Mason, instead of offering a clear definition of what substantially equivalent
events are or should be.227 Rather than providing a meaningful rationale as to
why it did not consider the general taxation scheme and the MSW surcharge in
Oregon Waste Systems to be substantially equivalent events, the majority weakly
asserted that the Court had had a "recent reluctance" to recognize new categories,
that the Silas Mason tax pairing was the only compensatory tax upheld "in recent
memory" and that the Court would not "plunge... into the morass of weighing
comparative tax burdens. 228
Despite the Court's disappointing analysis as to why the taxes were not
substantially equivalent events, it is certainly possible to arrive at the Court's
conclusion based upon their application of the test. However, the Court
222. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
223. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1352.
224. Id. at 1353.
225. Id (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 128 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
226. See supra notes 80-98, 108 and accompanying text.
227. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct at 1353 (citing Silas Mason, 300 U.S. at 579).
228. Id. (quoting HELLERSTEIN, supra note 104, at 150).
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apparently did not remember the rationale underlying the substantially equivalent
events requirement. In Silas Mason, the taxes were found to burden substantially
equivalent events, i.e., purchases.229 The two taxes taken together thus eliminated
any competitive disadvantage to those commercial participants engaged in
interstate commerce." ° In contrast, the Armco manufacturing and wholesaling
taxes were not found to burden substantially equivalent events because they
burdened substantially different actors in the chain of handlers of articles of
trade.231  Thus, the question about whether the Court's application of the
substantially equivalent events test was even warranted should boil down to
whether the surcharge would have competitively disadvantaged the petitioners. 2
As a preliminary matter, it is useful to note that demand for garbage
disposal services, especially when small fluctuations in costs are involved, enjoys
a relatively inelastic demand.2 33 Thus, the costs that business disposers and
haulers would be forced to pay by the surcharge would be relatively easy to pass
on to their customers. Out-of-state customers of business disposers that dispose
of MSW in Oregon participate at the same economic level as the at-large
taxpayers in Oregon who largely fund the solid waste programs through
"nondisposal" taxes. If the Oregon Waste Systems petitioners could pass the
surcharge costs on to their customers, the businesses would not suffer any
competitive disadvantage under any analysis. Moreover, if all of the costs of the
surcharge were passed on to the individual customers, then those customers would
presumably be paying exactly their fair share relative to Oregon taxpayers who
pay "nondisposal" taxes to support Oregon's solid waste program.
Even assuming that the costs of the surcharge could not be passed on to
individual customers, the petitioners would still not have been put at a
competitive disadvantage. Business petitioners were concerned about the
surcharge because they supposed that it meant that they would have to pay more
to dispose of their out-of-state customers' MSW, which in turn would drive up
their total costs, and thus they would be put at a competitive disadvantage.
A careful analysis shows that petitioners' fear that they would have been
disadvantaged compared to their competitors who disposed of a relatively higher
proportion of Oregon MSW in Oregon was nearly groundless. Here, petitioners'
229. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
232. Some commentators have pointed out that "[m]ore recently ... the Court has not focused on
identifying competitors. Instead... the Court indicated that taxes must be levied on 'substantially
equivalent events' for them to be considered complementary." Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra
note 15, at 910. The same commentators note that because of the test's evolving standards, it is
"unclear" just how the Court now decides whether two taxes are "complementary." See id. at 911.
233. See Butlin, supra note 10, at 148. However, Rehnquist's focus on the size of the charge
passed onto customers is as "myopic" as the majority's arguments that he attacks. See supra note
206 and accompanying text.
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business competitors would have been subject to the same burdens by the
surcharge as would petitioners. The surcharge was based upon the state of
residency of the waste generator. As a result, the expense of disposing
petitioners' individual customers' MSW would not vary with whether petitioners
or their competitors disposed of the MSW. However, the business disposer who
initially disposed of a relatively higher proportion of Oregon-generated MSW
("Company A") could have conceivably captured an additional part of the out-of-
state MSW disposal market because they could have passed some of their lower
total costs of disposing Oregon MSW on to new out-of-state customers more
easily than could their out-of-state MSW-intensive counterpart ("Company B"),
which must charge higher average fees to all its customers to operate at a profit.
Nonetheless, the possibility of Company A being able to capture some of
Company B's out-of-state market due to lower overall operational costs suffers
from two problems. First, business disposers located in Oregon would
presumably be like Company A because they are the businesses with a higher
proportion of Oregon customers. For Company A to add out-of-state customers,
Company A would have to establish new routes out-of-state, an expensive
proposition. Though such expenses might act as a deterrent to Company A from
taking Company B's clients, the following scenario is far more likely to act as a
disincentive.
If Company A accepted out-of-state customers that would by definition
have MSW that was more expensive to dispose, the added expense associated
with handling those customers' MSW would raise the total costs that would need
to be passed on to all of Company A's original customers and would have the
effect of increasing Company A's marginal costs. This increase in costs would
lead some of Company A's Oregon customers to switch to any company with
lower costs. Again, companies of choice would be those with proportionally
more Oregon customers ("Company A-i"). Thus, it would be risky for Company
A to take on Company B's out-of-state customers, lest Company A-1 steal
Company A's customers after Company A's marginal costs increase. Such a
built-in disincentive mechanism would likely force Company A to refrain from
trying to capture a significant number of Company B's customers.
Moreover, Company B, if close enough to be potentially in competition
with Company A, would, of course, be "eligible" to capture some of the Oregon
MSW market and thereby reduce their marginal costs and thus the costs they pass
on to their individual customers. Although initially attracting customers would
be difficult for Company B because of the higher total costs which would need
to be passed on to new customers, claiming Oregon customers would likely not
have been difficult if Company B had initially lost some of their customers to
Company A. Company A would then have marginal costs more closely aligned
with Company B's marginal costs. In a worst case scenario for petitioners, an
equilibrium would be established between Company A and Company B so that
each would have a similar proportion of in-state and out-of-state customers.
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However, for the reasons suggested above, garnering more out-of-state customers
might not be initially profitable for Company A.
For all of these reasons, the negative competitive impact of the surcharge
is likely to be slight, if any, on companies involved in the disposal of MSW. As
a result, the competition-preserving policy behind the substantially equivalent
events prong is lacking: 4 the requirement that the taxes meet this prong may
have no rationale behind it other than to ease the Court's burden of comparing
taxes. Conveniently, but apparently overlooked by the majority, the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality had already performed a detailed tax
comparison pursuant to its recommendation for the surcharge.235
Gilliam County's concerns were presumably that its disposal rates would
go up as out-of-state waste became more expensive to dispose. However, from
a judicial perspective, the county's concerns as a participant in the competitive
business market must be considered secondary to its role as a local government
serving the entire range of its citizens' needs. In an analysis of Oregon's solid
waste program funds, three tax sources contributed: Oregon MSW disposal
companies, out-of-state MSW disposal companies, and Oregon general
taxpayers-not out-of-state taxpayers. Because neither out-of-state taxpayers nor
out-of-state MSW disposal companies using Oregon landfill space paid the true
costs for Oregon to implement its full program, Oregon should hold those out-of-
state entities accountable for the externalities that they impose. The surcharge
forces out-of-state beneficiaries of Oregon's resources and program expenditures,
whether they are the disposal companies or their customers, to internalize the
costs associated with MSW disposal." 6
The Court's sole non-posturing rationale regarding the substantially
equivalent events prong rests in its observation that "the very fact that in-state
234. See supra notes 46-47, 57-58, 166 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
236. It be could contended that if those disposers of out-of-state waste are forced to pay for
externalities, then the out-of-state MSW surcharge would leave those companies that dispose of
Oregon MSW still disposing of the MSW at less than economically efficient costs. This may be
so, but all state programs cannot realistically be operated by raising funds directly from those
businessesthat impose externalities on the state; instead, the administrative reality is that states need
to raise some of their revenue from the general tax scheme to help pay for externalities such as
running the state's solid waste program. A state should be able to choose which businesses will pay
what proportion of those externalities as long as their choice does not put one business at a
significant competitive disadvantage or spread the burden unreasonably. Simply because a decision
was made along state lines should not end the inquiry; instead, a surcharge on those out-of-state
MSW disposers is a fair first step. In the pre-surcharge structure, the "nondisposal" tax impacts
Oregonians only, and the disposal base fees on both sides of the state line combine to pay for the
externalities of both states' disposal habits. The burden in such a situation is clearly discriminatory
along state lines, against Oregonians. In the post-surcharge structure, presumably both states are
paying for the externalities that they impose: Oregon through nondisposal taxes and disposal fees,
and other states through disposal base fees and surcharges. The difference in the structures arise
because Oregon cannot force out-of-staters to pay externalities through general taxes.
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shippers of out-of-state waste, such as Oregon Waste Systems, are charged the
out-of-state surcharge even though they pay Oregon income taxes refutes
respondents' argument that the respective taxable events are substantially
equivalent." 7  This observation, although somewhat appealing superficially,
actually amounts to little: petitioners were engaged directly in the business of
disposing MSW in Oregon and therefore were a direct source of the harm. Funds
expended to ameliorate the harm need to be compensated. Petitioners' payment
of income taxes only covered a small portion of that for which Oregon was
seeking compensation: the total costs of disposing out-of-state MSW in Oregon.
The income tax that petitioners paid was hardly "compensatory" given the
externalities imposed by out-of-state MSW disposal.
The Court treated the possible resource protectionist aim in Oregon Waste
Systems as an issue separate from the "compensatory tax" claim. 8 However, the
Baldwin 39 and Sporhase240 decisions counsel differently, deeming the taking of
natural resources a compensable action.2 4' Because natural resources cannot be
valued adequately by the market2 42 and because their sustainable preservation is
crucial to the state's vitality and not to any one business or industry, such
resources are justifiably protected through a reasonable restriction against out-of-
state users who, in aggregate, could ultimately pose a serious threat to that
resource.
The natural resource at stake in Oregon Waste Systems-adequate landfill
space, clean groundwater and clean air-all demand compensation from those
who would cause environmental externalities, even though their market value is
not easily discernible. The intrastate taxes imposed to maintain the quality of the
natural resources do not always have a correlative substantially equivalent event
to tax. Instead, the funds for their preservation must often come from the revenue
pool created through a general tax scheme. This consideration renders a strict
substantially equivalent events test inappropriate for cases in which resource
protection involves reasonable restrictions on interstate commerce.
The Court's conclusion that Oregon failed to meet the substantially
equivalent events prong precluded a meaningful assessment of whether the
surcharge was a rough approximation of the proportion of the tax burden imposed
through Oregon's general tax scheme that funded the state's solid waste programs.
Not reaching this prong was an unfortunate byproduct of the Court's problematic
analysis of the substantially equivalent events prong. This result is unfortunate
because Oregon performed a far more comprehensive task in roughly
237. Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. CL at 1353.
238. See id at 1353-54.
239. 436 U.S. 371.
240. 458 U.S. 941.
241. See supra notes 109-25 and accompanying text
242. See TURNEP, supra note 10, at 26, 74.
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approximating the tax burden than did its arbitrarily-acting predecessors in Hun2 43
and Fort Gratiot,244 and even in some cases where compensatory taxes were
upheld, as in Clark,245 Brice,246 and Arctic Maid.247 Still, the Court in Oregon
Waste Systems relied on Hunt even though, in Hunt, Alabama did not attempt to
apportion their costs in a reasonable manner. The Court presumably found the
surcharge easier to damn under its mechanical application of the substantially
equivalent events prong than under Oregon's careful attempt to meet the strictures
of the rough approximation prong.
By not addressing whether the taxes were roughly approximate, the Court
was able to skirt confronting the list of externalities imposed on Oregon by out-
of-state MSW disposal. Petitioner CRC complained that "'[c]ost' components
such as 'loss of quiet enjoyment,' reimbursement for tax credits, lost disposal
capacity, and a risk premium for unfunded environmental liability are not
collected through domestic tipping fees."248 Although petitioners were technically
correct in their assertions, the costs they listed still represented actual costs to
Oregon, regardless of whether the expenditures to pay for those costs were
collected through domestic tipping fees. Moreover, both respondents249 and Chief
Justice Rehnquist" ° could, and did, recognize the other large and more easily
quantifiable costs presented by out-of-state MSW.
The Court's reliance upon Hunt in Oregon Waste Systems also had one
other distasteful aspect: in Hunt, the only facility that received waste was private,
for which the state could not justifiably seek "compensation." 1 In Oregon Waste
Systems, the state was supporting the landfills and the solid waste program and
thus could have been compensated for direct fiscal expenditures, not just for
natural resource depreciation.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORMING THE COMPENSATORY TAX DOCTRNE IN
MSW RESTRICTION CASES
After Oregon Waste Systems, states presumably cannot impose surcharges
on out-of-state MSW in addition to the base fees imposed on all MSW. Even if
a state could bear the administrative hassle of setting aside tax revenue received
through its general tax scheme and accounting for the precise sums spent on all
243. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2016.
244. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2021,
245. Clark, 306 U.S. at 599.
246. Brice, 339 U.S. at 545.
247. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. at 204.
248. Reply Brief of Petitioners Columbia Resource Company, L.P., at 7, Oregon Waste Systems,
114 S. Ct. 1345 (No. 93-70) (No. 93-108).
249. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 139.
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of its solid waste programs, that state presumably could still not impose a
surcharge on out-of-state MSW because it would probably fail the substantially
equivalent events prong of the compensatory tax *test.2 However, because the
compensatory tax test applied by the Court still appears to be in flux,"53 the Court
could take notice, perhaps, of the wisdom of adapting or reformulating the
doctrine to suit the different contexts within which the doctrine is applied.
Because some noted Commerce Clause scholars have already suggested ideas for
more clearly delineating the compensatory tax doctrine in general, 4 this Note
will only offer suggestions in the context of interstate commerce restrictions on
non-traditional articles of commerce, particularly MSW, in which, either directly
or indirectly, part of the restrictions' goals is also protection of a natural resource.
Perhaps most importantly, the substantially equivalent events prong should
be modified to be more in line with the policies underlying natural resource
preservation in Baldwin.255 The prong should be adapted to reflect more judicial
willingness to compare general tax schemes to specific taxes, as in Baldwin,
Clark, and Brice, instead of rigidly holding that specific taxes can never be
compensatory for revenues raised through a general tax scheme.
If the Court does not return to some form of its willingness to compare
specific tax burdens with general tax burdens, state taxpayers cannot seek a
reasonable partial reimbursement for payment of general taxes that are used to
support a resource which is also used by non-residents. The consequences of
such a system, one apparently mandated by Oregon Waste Systems, is to
encourage residents of some states to abuse the natural resources of other states
and then escape paying any just compensation. The transformation of the Court's
original use of the substantially equivalent events prong, once used to ensure a
level playing field among competitive businesses and now used to ensure simpler
compensatory tax analyses, will continue to hamstring those states attempting to
fund their natural resource protection programs without breaking the backs of
their own citizens. Simplicity alone, however, is not enough to justify a lack of
analysis, 6 particularly where the presence of the policy reasons behind the
application of a test are questionable, as they are here. Costs imposed by
interstate commerce on depletable natural resources are undoubtedly difficult to
compute and, in turn, to compensate. Nevertheless, the Court must plunge
forward anyway, or their reluctance will prevent states from taking significant
measures to protect the sustainability of natural resources and to seek
compensation for their use. The Court indicated its willingness in Baldwin to
discriminate, at least incidentally, against interstate commerce when doing so
would effectuate legitimate protection of a state's natural resource. No adaptation
252. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 15, at 457-63.
255. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383, 386.
256. See supra note 108.
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of the test would mean that compensatory taxes could never by permitted to
compensate for environmental programs that are partly funded through general tax
schemes, the arrangement under which most state environmental programs are
operated. A loosening of the substantially equivalent events prong in cases
involving resource protection, then, would be an appropriate adaptation of the
test.
257
In rethinking a new substantially equivalent events test for resource
protection cases, the Court should consider allowing the expenditure of funds
raised through a state's general taxation scheme to be compensated reasonably by
a tax on nonresidents who use the resource, if the tax does not have the effect of
putting interstate commerce at a discernible disadvantage. 8 If the specific tax
is meant to compensate for the expenditure of general tax funds and does not
place the party or industry subject to the specific surcharge at a competitive
disadvantage, then the main policy concerns behind application of the
substantially equivalent events prong can be avoided, and the question of rough
approximation should be addressed. 9
Of course, the compensatory tax should still roughly approximate the
burden on intrastate commerce. Because the state imposing a facially
discriminatory tax is burdening interstate commerce, that state should have the
burden of showing that the tax imposed not only roughly approximates the
intrastate tax burden but also that the purpose of the tax is compensatory rather
than discriminatory.26° Although proof of "rough approximation" may be a heavy
burden, the imposing state should be allowed an opportunity to meet the burden
because it is in the best position to account for all of the costs (direct and
indirect, economic and environmental) incurred as a result of interstate commerce.
Businesses, subject to the compensatory tax, that impose externalities are certainly
not in as good a position to dispute the costs of the externalities that they impose
but should have the opportunity to rebut any "proved" costs.
257. Ideas about exactly how the substantially equivalent events prong should be reformulated or
treated in future nonarbitrary, non-competition effecting compensatory tax cases are too numerous
to flesh out in detail. On one extreme, perhaps the prong should be discarded. On the other
extreme, perhaps the prong should be just as strictly applied as it is now, with a single exception
carved out for the comparison of general tax schemes with surcharges on out-of-state natural
resource users.
258. See supra notes 46-47, 57-58, 166 and accompanying text.
259. The superfluous identification "prong" of the Oregon Waste Systems'compensatory tax test
should be discarded. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
260. But see supra note 158 and accompanying text. Usually, as espoused in the Oregon Court
of Appeals decision, the challenger of a potential constitutional violation has the burden of proving
a violation. Gilliam County, 837 P.2d at 976. For compensatory tax cases, the same could hold true
for the whole case, except for the rough approximation prong. Once a statute has been deemed
facially discriminatory, the state presumably has more information to show that the scheme, taken
as a whole, is not discriminatory but is instead a rough approximation of intrastate tax burdens.
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In allowing a state to prove its burden of comparing taxes, the Court
should give substantial weight to state legislative or administrative factfinding
endeavors, as in Clark.26" ' Precision should not be required, though, or an
imposing state would rarely, if ever, meet its burden. Moreover, courts would
otherwise become mired in minutiae and endlessly-debated discrepancies and
would feel obligated to expend time to ensure exact compensation. Such an
approximate accounting would not depart from earlier doctrine but would be in
accord with the Arctic Maid rough approximation test.262 This prong appears
satisfactory in its present form, although it may be subject to inconsistent
interpretations.
The earliest formulation of the doctrine, found in Day,263 postulated that
a compensatory tax should save an otherwise discriminatory tax from
constitutional infirmity if the tax is nondiscriminatory in purpose and effect,
applying a fairness and reasonableness standard.2" The rigidity that has since
been introduced to add discipline to compensatory tax analyses has ultimately
resulted in the Court's inability to adapt the test to meet the evolving, often
intermeshing, worlds of varied tax mechanisms, environmental science and the
administrative state. Instead, the flexibility enunciated in, and objectives
underlying, the Day decision seem forgotten in today's compensatory tax
jurisprudence. Such flexibility is now needed to adapt the test to new contexts,
instead of rote application of a stale form of the test.
Only in the latter half of this century has the economics community begun
valuing environmental resources and impacts that were previously not valued or
undervalued due to their inability to be traded in the marketplace.265 Just because
the compensatory tax doctrine evolved primarily before methods were developed
to value these resources and environmental externalities does not mean that
natural resources and externalities should not now be included in modem-day
analyses of areas in which states have the right to seek compensation. In
Baldwin,266 the underlying principle was that natural resource damage may be too
great if a state cannot fairly regulate its resources against interstate commerce and
that environmental protectionism, when the burden is fairly apportioned, should
not be subject to the same per se rule of invalidity that is applied to economic
protectionism.267 The same ideas should remain at the forefront when considering
easing the rigid compensatory tax test for natural resource protection.
261. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
263. 270 U.S. 367.
264. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
265. See John Mclnemey, Natural Resource Economics: The Basic Analytical Principles, in
ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 32.
266. Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371.
267. See supra note 117.
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Finally, the same principles that guided Maine v. Taylor26 8 must be
cautiously extended to other contexts. Unique dangers like those posed in Maine
should not be the only basis for placing some fair burden upon interstate
commerce. Some leeway must be allowed for states to argue, here via the
compensatory tax test, that qualities other than uniqueness-such as dramatically
increased volume of waste, rate of degradation, or unequal tax burdens supporting
a resource-are compensable in the natural resources context. The Court should
recognize that expanding the compensatory tax test could encourage economically
efficient use of natural resources by nonresidents and spur environmental vitality
in states that impose restrictions. "[T]he constitutional principles underlying the
commerce clause cannot be read as requiring the State... to sit idly by and wait
until potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred ....
Furthermore:
[T]he commerce clause.., does not elevate free trade above all
other values. As long as a state does not.., place itself in a
position of economic isolation . . . it retains broad regulatory
authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the
integrity of its natural resources.
Surely, given this ideal, when free trade is not discernably affected and
the tax on interstate commerce reflects reasonable compensation for the
expenditure of intrastate taxes, a state tax burdening interstate commerce should
not offend the Commerce Clause when it shifts environmental externalities upon
those who use the resource. Nominally calling the tax "compensatory" is not a
good enough reason to change the analysis.
268. 477 U.S. 131; see supra note 196 and accompanying text.
269. Maine 477 U.S. at 148 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (Me. 1984)).
270. Id. at 151 (citations omitted).
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